The behavioural densification of the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in public financial control

Abstract

This study argues that the criteria of economy, efficiency and effectiveness enshrined in the Law on the Organisation and Procedure of the Court of Auditors constitute a densification of the financial oversight function conferred on the Court by Article 214 of the Constitution. On this premise, it finds that their application in case law remains close to the neoclassical rational-choice paradigm and proposes, by contrast, that their operative content be deepened with insights from behavioural economics – for instance, by bringing into the analysis topics such as friction costs, choice architecture and, more generally, behavioural and causal assumptions of decision-making. Drawing on comparative experience, it presents a fivestage framework for performance auditing, subject to a principle of methodological proportionality. The proposal neither creates a fourth criterion for financial oversight nor permits review of political merits; it seeks to make the assessment of the relationship between resources, behaviour and outcomes more realistic.